======================================================================== 1121 Date: Mon, 6 Jun 94 18:12:23 EST From: JOBRIEN@ucs.indiana.edu X-To: PO%"antowner%ubvm.bitnet@uicvm.uic.edu" Subject: Submission for WJA: World Journal of Anthropology, #4 from John O'Brien To: antowner%ubvm.bitnet@uicvm.uic.edu UNIT AND ELEMENT CONCEPTS IN HUMAN ORGANIZATION: PIAGET VS. VYGOTSKII * JOHN D. O'BRIEN rev. 12.25.89 * Paper presented to the 1991 North Central Sociological Association, Session on Theory, Detroit, Michigan. ABSTRACT This paper examines the difference between unit and element concepts of organizational patterning. It is, also, a critical analysis of Piaget's Genetic Epistemology, contrasting his assumptions, core concepts, and structural methods to the historical materialist approach of Vygotskii. The work presents an ethnomethodological analysis of Piaget's conceptual reality, and his religious and ideological biases. It also explores the evolutionary analogies used by both men, and their respective concepts about mental structures and processes. Due to the biases and goals that Piaget and Vygotskii have, the validity of both theories is open to question. There are, however, assumptions that could lead to an alternative theory. Research in brain neurophysiology indicates the existence of possible organizational morphogenesis through universal cognitive fields: describable by both linear and non-linear analogies. The paper also notes some principles of their transformations into orders of structure, learning development, and behaviors. INTRODUCTION The theory of Soviet psychologist Lev S. Vygotskii is highly critical of Piaget's work (Vygotskii 1962). Vygotskii's ideas about cognitive development are a form of dialectical materialism. Oddly, like Piaget, he began with an assumption that cognitive structures, the mechanisms of their origins, and their transformations into behavior exist and are identifiable. Even though Piaget and Vygotskii both use a structural method, there are substantive differences between the two theories. Vygotskii believes that affect and intellect is inseparable in the study of the mind; Piaget does not. Both men attempt a dialectical explanation of cognitive development, and agree that an empirical approach is necessary. However, Vygotskii strongly criticizes Piaget for allowing hypotheses to determine the nature of the experiments, instead of allowing the data to cause hypotheses: deduction versus induction. Realistically, neither theory is sufficiently tested. Therefore, contrasting the assumptions, similarities, and differences between them produces a clearer picture of the central concepts in both. It also provides one method that helps determine the validity of the respective theories. ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS Ethnomethodology acknowledges the probability of some ultimate reality, but it does not acknowledge that human beings have the capacity to comprehend it. By definition, any perception of reality is only a mental construct by the perceiver. Any one reality construct is as valid as any other, but our culture promotes its own unique world- view. No living person is free from its influence through modern communications. Keeping this in mind, a statement by Piaget in 1969 is very illuminating. His comment relates to the results of cross-cultural, developmental research: specifically to work done on the island of Martinique to test his theories. His explanation of the findings (by the way, the research uses his methods and the findings contradict predictions made by his theory) is that the children of that society are lazy. They do not fit the model (Bringuier 1980:14), and test four years behind the predicted level. It appears he does not believe that this, and similar contradicting studies, provide any reason to reconsider his theory (Dasen 1977). Consider that cross-cultural studies using Piaget's theories may not examine cultural differences in cognitive development, only degrees of acculturation to the world- view of the West. This possibility raises certain questions. How universal is Piaget's theory; does this theory only describe the form of development in Western culture? How universally applicable is the theory within our societies? Is the theory an accurate model of intellectual development? Analyses do show distortions and biases in Piaget's thinking. The telling evidence is his refusal to use the findings on Martinique, and other cross-cultural studies, to revise the theory. Instead, he elects to dismiss the contradictions as accelerations or delays in particular cultures. What kind of objective scientist would not consider that unexpected and contradictory experimental results might indicate inadequacy in the model, even though that model makes incorrect predictions? The ethnomethodological concept of an object constancy assumption (Mehan and Wood 1975:68) suggests that Piaget's choice is the result of a reflexive process in his own mind. Object constancy assumptions require that any contradiction to absolute beliefs (basic and unalterable assumptions about the nature of reality) must be explained away, and in terms that reinforce the basic assumptions themselves. Thus, the school children, and by generalization the entire society of Martinique, is lazy (Bringuier 1980:34). Accepting this functions to deny the possibility that beliefs might be incorrect. Congenital to the West is the unquestionable assumption that formality, rationality, and abstraction are superior to any other form of thought. Piaget's scientific world-view could never allow for other, equally legitimate, realities. Alone, however, the formal, rational, and abstract struc- tures of European thinking are insufficient to explain and understand day to day life. Vygotskii (1962) insists that affect and intellect is inseparable. They represent only a small part of all known mental processes. In this light, Piaget's theories are only his own personal perception of reality, not a model with empirical support. His posited universal development is only a simple, survival oriented and goal directed alignment procedure (the normal activity of human beings facing adaptation to a different and con- flicting culture). Most of Piaget's theory comes from his personal research with young children. However, it appears that he could not accept the possibility that the observer might alter the responses of the observed, simply by the act of observation. In Structuralism, Piaget (1970) acknow- ledges this. It shows even more clearly by examining his brand of structuralism, and in a comparison of Piaget's and Vygotskii's works. STRUCTURALIST ASSUMPTIONS According to Piaget (1970:5) cognitive structures are transformational systems. Laws of function and self- regulation govern them; they are dynamic, in a constant state of change and not a mere static collection of elements. Rather, they are by definition wholes instead of aggregates of independent elements. One of the essential assumptions of Genetic Epistemology is that the laws govern- ing a structural whole cannot be reduced to a cumulative, one-by-one, association of its elements. Piaget accepts the proposition that a total system differs from the sum of its parts. In doing so, he specifically rejects Durkheimian and Gestalt concepts of an emergent entity: a creation of the interaction of the different elements that compose it. This is a contradiction needing resolution. Piaget chooses to avoid the problem through an homological proposition. He stresses that the relationships between parts and their relative orders, not the parts nor the whole, are what are of primary importance (Piaget 1970:7-9). On the issue of the origin of cognitive structures, Piaget specifically rejects both a priori pre-formations and structural creations by emergence. Instead, he opts for structures constructed through the operation of laws. In effect he believes that universal laws of transformation govern their composition. Therefore, they consistently create and recreate given structures under the same condi- tions. Transformation, to Piaget, means understandable and gradual change; conservation means that some essence of intelligible sameness continues from the beginnings of transformation to the end. On the basis of these concepts, he rejects even Chomsky's idea of formal, time free, mathe- matical, and logical foundations for structures (Piaget 1970:12). Piaget's ideas provide a conceptual basis for the use of a unilinear, evolutionary analogy of development: change the simple to complex forms. The structuralist as- sumptions of Vygotskii differ substantially from Piaget's, and they lead to remarkably different conclusions. PIAGET VERSUS VYGOTSKII Piaget and Vygotskii both hold a Western world-view. Vygotskii is a representative of Marxist-Leninist ideology less than 20 years after the Soviet revolution. Piaget is a representative of an equally ideological perspective - even if conflicting in certain key items of religious faith. None-the-less, both men assert that learning development comes through the disruption of existing mental stability. This acts as the stimulus for problem solving activity, which is an effort to restore stability or equilibrium. Piaget expresses this as the law of awareness (i.e., dis- ruption makes the actor aware of actions in progress) (Piaget 1970:15-17). Both men also believe (Vygotskii 1962:21-23) that the basis of mental activity is found in identifiable cognitive structures and processes, and both assume that a biological dialectic determines development. Piaget argues that a se- quence of conflicts between two genetic drives (pleasure- needs satisfaction and adaptation to reality) creates the dialectic. He calls the syntheses the vital force behind directed thought (Piaget 1970:21). Vygotskii claims that Piaget's dialectical concept is pure metaphysics: nothing more than a variation of Freud's ideas. He argues that adapting to the reality of the world, including social demands, is in itself a pleasure-need satisfaction. There- fore, no genetic dialectic exists, as Piaget claims, to create such a force. Instead, Vygotskii suggests two different biological sources for the brain functions of thought and speech (neither unified nor parallel but interactive and identifi- able in humans, primates, and other animals). Conceptual unity comes from their interaction, and symbolization im- presses on the organism through a series of molecular brain changes, over time. What Vygotskii suggests (1962:43-48) is that use creates particular mental functions. Obviously, the core of Piaget's genetic dialectic, pleasure-needs versus adaptation requirements, is the assumption that the child is fully separated from society: by definition, in an adversarial and competitive relationship with it. Just as obviously, Vygotskii's core belief is that the child is an integral part of society from the moment of birth, and in a cooperative relationship with society and the world. For Vygotskii, cognitive development is explicable by a dialectic between independent speech and thought centers, located in different physical areas of the brain. Contem- porary research supports this contention (Gazzaniga 1985). In turn, this dialectic leads to the differentiation of self, the molecular distribution of concepts throughout the brain, and the emergence of mind. IDEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS FAITH As far as mind and consciousness are concerned, Vygotskii is an ideological atheist. He rejects, out of hand, any suggestion of deity, a priori consciousness with a directional plan (Vygotskii 1962:25), or rational intent as the driving force in the development of thought and speech. He claims that theological propositions are unscientific, tautological and a block to the proper dialectical study of thought and speech in interaction. They logically limit the role of the social environment to accelerating, or delaying development. However, he replaces those concepts with ideas of pre-formed social collectivity and natural, universal, historical-social laws. Piaget believes the opposite; he assumes preexisting, rationally directed, evolutionary processes (orthogenesis) based on the metaphysical principle of equilibrium. He has absolute faith that environmental forces and the processes of evolution are rationally directed by God's laws (Piaget 1916:29). Therefore, he automatically excludes certain pos- sibilities. For example, he rejects the behaviorist posi- tion (as does Vygotskii) that learning is imitation. He does not believe in aggregation: that a whole equals the sum of its parts (as does Vygotskii). He does not consider that society, or mind, is an emergent entity (which Vygotskii accepts). This means that laws governing the mind cannot be described simply as an aggregate of laws that apply to the parts. It also means, implicitly, that Piaget accepts the concept that humanity and deity are cooperating in the creation of an ultimate, planned, final society. Piaget holds the belief that the Western perception of time is true: a medium through which the dimensions of space move in only a unilinear fashion. On the other hand, Vygotskii assumes that society is a collective entity and an a priori reality that exists outside linear time. The individual's mind develops through differential learning. It changes from a state of original equality and union, with society and the collective mind, into a unit that is no longer equal to the social whole. However, as a unit, the individual mind retains the structural qualities of the whole. Thus, society yields both self and society (Vygotskii 1962:19). Piaget, consistent with his theology, resents the development of thought as a gradual, unilinear change caused by socialization. The individual is born in- dependent of the social whole, and through the process of socialization becomes a member of society (God creates natural law: preexisting deity rationally yields self and society). Piaget says, in La Mission de l'Idee (1916), "--- the good is life. Life is a force that penetrates matter, or- ganizes it, introduces harmony, love. Above the cell it animates and creates beings; above these individual beings, species. Above human groups it creates humanity. The good is the free action of this force --- it is not the good of the individual or even of any higher groups." It appears that Piaget assumes that it is justifiable to interfere with the individual, social, or cultural good to achieve God's plan - as Piaget, and Piaget alone, defines it. "To hasten evolution is to do good" (Piaget 1916). Obviously, one of his assumptions is the concept of progress: a belief in a universal goal for humanity --- ordained by God. Both Piaget's and Vygotskii's modes of analyses are consistent with their respective ideologies. Piaget's mode is elemental; he assumes that thought and speech are inde- pendent, separate systems that have their own characteris- tics. They act as the elements of mind; and, as such they have structures, and function in terms of their pure properties. In contrast, Vygotskii's mode is unitary (unlike Piaget's elements with separate qualities). Al- though different, speech and thought are units of the col- lective mind that retain the properties of the whole. Over time, and in functional interaction, these create a dynamic and variable psychic unity (Vygotskii 1962:1-3). The process through which this takes place is an interac- tive, and dialectically generated, permanent molecular change in the brain's neurological structure. According to Vygotskii, it is "the internalization of overt action that makes thought possible and develops mental constructs" (1962: v-vii): a belief that function creates organ. His main point is that human beings construct dynamic, higher order structures (Piaget agrees) that incorporate, as well as give new power and form to, earlier structures (Piaget disagrees). Even with such strikingly different assump- tions, both men concur that there is a qualitative dif- ference between child and adult thought (Vygotskii 1962:9). They understand this as an evolutionary development. DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ANALOGIES Both men use an evolutionary analogy (Vygotskii 1962:10); however, Vygotskii argues that the particular results of development are historically, socially, and culturally determined - not unilinear nor absolute. Piaget's basic idea (universal, progressive stages and the conservation of structures leading to an ultimate, desirable intellectual state) is an analogy of unilinear theories of evolution. Vygotskii's basic idea is both materialist and multilinear. Piaget claims that the cause of mental differentiation is the organism's functional need: always leading to a single end-state of adaptation. Vygotskii looks to different possible effects of the material and social environment for the basis of cognitive development. Unilinear evolutionary analogies are common to Spencer, Durkheim, Lewis Henry Morgan, Marx et al. Since the 1920's (Sanderson 1988; Steward 197 it is evident, to many, that unilinear theories are based on erroneous facts and contain gross biases. For example, they assert severely ethnocentric beliefs in the superiority of European culture. They also hold to concepts of progress leading toward more human rationality (or happiness), and tendencies to use descriptions of transformations as explanations of change. Therefore, it would be beneficial to replace Piaget's anal- ogy (cognitive development corresponding to unilinear evolu- tion) with more recent approaches to cultural evolution. Steward's findings about cultural evolution relate to both Piaget's and Vygotskii's theories. Steward is an Anthropologist, whose theories of cultural evolution, Man and the environment are well accepted. In many ways he parallels Piaget. Both insist that they began their work as naturalists with a strong emphasis on biological systems; both believe that there is an ir- reducible reality governed by natural laws. Both men search for general laws that determine change over time. Both in- sist that they require empirical data to make generaliza- tions. Yet, Piaget and Steward reach very different conclu- sions about the inevitability of all humanity developing a Western European style culture, as the inevitable end of the evolutionary process. Steward's evolutionary model is more similar to Vygotskii's theory than to Piaget's. It shows that there are different possible, but predictable, processes of cul- tural development. These move from the less complex to the more complex (analogous to children's cognitive development and analogous to Vygotskii's concepts of complex or concept development). However, Steward (unlike Piaget) places no value on the desirability of any proposed final form. He does he claim that any given cultural form is the inevitable result of progression from less complex to more complex. instead, his theory states that form is a result of the human interaction with specific types of environments. The results will differ substantially if the environments are different (as Vygotskii believed). Although, Piaget and Vygotskii both use a biological analogy, Piaget appears to have consciously ignored one of the basic principles of evolution. Biologist's know that the variability of an organism, in response to non-random (but virtually unpredictable) environmental force, is finite. They also know that it is of such a potentially im- mense range as to be unpredictable. This is true in terms of the final form of any evolutionary change or the time required for such a change to occur. Vygotskii's theory reflects this principle; Piaget's does not. Vygotskii (1962:51) proposes a preexisting entity, a collective social mind. Individuals are born an integral part of that entity called society. The development of the self, he believes, is due to different micro-environments providing slightly different experiences. This leads to a process that separates the child's mind into smaller units. Therefore, differences in the molecular organiza- tion of the brain emerge from differential experiences during each moment of life. This molecular reorganization, he believes, explains children's failures to master concepts (even under conditions of rigid formal education) for rela- tively long periods. Then, they suddenly show a capacity for handling the material: a quantum leap where everything suddenly clicks (Vygotskii 1962:95-100). This is quite consistent with orthodox Marxist ideology. There is a great parallel between the rapid transformation of mental or- ganization and the violent, rapid transformation of society through revolution. Piaget and Vygotskii both hypothesize developmental stages. Vygotskii denies that stages are universal (Vygotskii 1962:23) or unilinear. Still, Vygotskii (1962:46) proposes laws that govern four phases of develop- ment in mental operations using signs. He also notes that there is a continual increase in, and predominance of, dif- ferent types of thought at different ages: NATURAL: the pre-intellectual period of speech and pre-verbal thought with undifferentiated mental functions; NAIVE: experience with the properties of his own body, the objects around him and the application of this to the use of tools as a first intellectual exercise, clearly defined by the grammatical use of form, structure, perception, memory and differentiation; EXTERNAL SIGN: when a child uses his fingers, as in counting, or objects as the solution of internal problems; INGROWTH: when signs are internalized, introspection begins. Logical memory and inner speech develop. Vygotskii's core concept is that "--- thought development is determined by language --- (t)he child's intellectual growth is contingent upon his mastering the social means of thought, that is, language --- speech and intellect develop along separate genetically based lines --- intellectual growth is contingent on his mastering the social means of thought --- the later stage is not a continuation of the earlier" (Vygotskii 1962:47-51). Piaget's core concepts are that capacities present in a higher stage cannot be achieved until all capacities of the lower stage have been achieved; and, that the process of development is universal. Fixed and stages always occur in the same order, but there is variable cultural or social content (Vuyk 1981:190-228). SENSORIMOTOR: (birth to 2) intelligence expressed only through sensory (physical contact), can- not think (no language), does not dif- ferentiate self from environment, unaware of act consequences, does not understand object permanence; PREOPERATIONAL: (1 to 7) no understanding of such con- cepts as speed, weight, numbers, qualities, or causality and is ego- centric; CONCRETE-OPERATIONAL: (8 to 12) does not think in terms of abstract or hypothetical situations, but is able to handle the concrete world with adult cognitive skill; FORMAL-OPERATIONAL: (13 on) able to achieve formal, abstract thought, reason, think in terms of theories and generate and test hypotheses; not all achieve this. THEORETICAL COMPARISONS Vygotskii disagrees with Piaget on two critical points. Language and thought are absent in the child under age two. Egocentrism is the mediating factor between genetic predisposi- tion (autistic thought) and higher (directed) thought. Piaget claims that autistic thought is all pervasive until seven or eight years of age: after that, social thought (and thus social life) takes shape. The disagreement is over Piaget's assumption that autistic thought is individualistic, egocentric thought is need fulfilling, and directed thought is social. Vygotskii feels that the separate biological bases for thought and speech allow thought at an early age. Further, egocentric speech (or talking aloud) is a problem solving transition phase in the evolution of directed thought, from vocal to inner. He disagrees with Piaget's claim that egocentric thought dies away; instead, he feels it is internalized inner speech, crucial to directed thought (Vygotskii 1962:39-45). Other important points of disagreement between Vygotskii and Piaget are their respective hypotheses about concepts, concept formation processes, and mental structures. Piaget argues for biologically predetermined structures, invariant and socially elicited (i.e., mutually exclusive, self contained, and progressive by age). His belief is that development and instructions are totally separate. He posits two types of concepts: spontaneous (i.e., self learned, non-conscious and non-systematic) and non-spontaneous (i.e., adult instructed, systematic, and conscious). Consciousness emerges only when non-spontaneous, aware, mature, socialized thinking replaces and eliminates egocentric, unaware, non-spontaneous thinking. To Piaget, control of a mental function is equal to consciousness of that function. Claparede's Law (Vygotskii 1962:88) (i.e., difference creates maladaption that leads to awareness in proportion to the degree of maladaption) is his hypothesis for explaining the development that takes place in the Concrete- Operational stage. It results from the conflict between the egocentric desires of the child and the demands of adult society and education. Piaget supplements Claparede's Law with his own Law of Displacement. This explains the shift that comes from the Concrete-Operational to the Formal-Operational. Consciousness comes from transferring a mental concept from the realm of action to the realm of language. This recreates a concrete situation in the imagination so that it can be expressed in words. Vygotskii, on the other hand, conceives of structures that are not biologically predetermined, but rather are generated by predilected potentials for synthesis and generalization. These develop out of the dialectic between the interaction of capacities for speech and thought. In other words, he believes that there is a biologically determined organization in the brain that has the potential to synthesize any conflict between thought and speech units, unless interfered with. He feels that this synthesis creates new conceptual structures, and believes that the brain has the innate potential to change its molecular structure. This occurs to distribute the new concept throughout a hierarchy of reorganized knowledge. To Vygotskii, structures are not socially elicited; they are not imposed from outside through training and experience as Piaget argued. Rather, they generate during the operation of biological potentials and remain due to permanent molecular changes in the brain. Vygotskii sees cognitive structures as variable, not mutually exclusive, not self contained, and cer- tainly not progressive by age. Development and instruction are interactive and related. Learning requires the emergence of children's physiological capacities (i.e., a child cannot walk until skeletal, muscular, and neurological absolutes are present). Instruction is the capacity to initiate molecular changes in the brain. Therefore, children do not necessarily pass through specific stages at specific times, and education can easily introduce new concepts, as well as influence development. His argument is that the self organizing capacity of the brain, while distributing knowledge throughout itself, is an innate part of human biology. This includes the revision of existing knowledge to incorporate, and be consistent with, new knowledge or concepts. Vygotskii believes that these potentials never come into operation, unless the amorphous whole of the brain of a newborn child undergoes some form of internal differentiation into separate units of mental activity. This differentiation, he claims, originates in the division of the human brain into two separate areas: one specialized for speech functions, the other specialized for thought functions. The conflicting processing of the same stimuli by these two mutually exclusive areas, and their interaction, causes the formation of new concepts that unify and resolve the differences. He also argues that concept formation requires generalization, which is a form of abstraction; and, that each generalization is based on all preceding generalizations. Therefore, the development of all concept formation has the same characteristics (Vygotskii 1962:85). What Piaget calls discrete spontaneous or non-spontaneous structures, Vygotskii says are interactive, mutually influencing parts of a single process called concept formation. Conscious- ness, according to Vygotskii, implies generalization, which im- plies the formation of superordinate concepts. Superordinate concepts imply subordinate concepts, and this - in turn - im- plies hierarchical organization. Consciousness emerges when concepts are part of a system of perceived differences. He argues that this is dependent upon the development of speech. Egocentric speech does not vanish; it becomes non verbal (i.e., internalized), and it is used for problem solving, which is the basis of directed thought. Instruction interacts with spontaneous concepts, providing the nuclei of new concepts. These new structures (concepts) then interact with existing mental structures, and the inevitable conflict of the two is the catalyst that stimulates the brain's potential for molecular reorganization: incorporating the newest structure. Even though this process occurs at any age, Vygotskii asserts (1962:103) that there are sensitive periods, when an organism is particularly open to influences. He proposes that "--- the basic characteristic of any (cognitive) structure is its independence from its original substance and its ability to be transferred to other media," (Vygotskii 1962:95). Piaget's research methods investigate the already formed concepts of children, through the child's verbal definition of content (Vygotskii 1962:52-55). This method, Vygotskii points out, is often only a test of a child's knowledge and experience. It concentrates on words; it fails to take into account the per- ception, and mental elaboration of sensory material, that gives birth to a concept. This ignores process. Essentially, Vygotskii claims that Piaget's work misses the point; it stresses methods that examine verbal behavior in typically non- verbal children: the wrong half of a whole. It is Vygotskii's attempt to describe structures and processes that is most interesting. He asserts that experiments, by Ach in 1921 (Vygotskii 1962:54), demonstrate that concept formation is not based on associative connections, regardless of how strong the association is between verbal symbols and objects. Simply put, he says that an associative chain (i.e., where one link calls forth the next) is not the process by which concepts are form. Instead, he proposes that there are specific types of mental structures. These are heaps, five types of complexes, and concepts; and, they arrange in a hierarchy from simple heaps to complex concepts, with the complex types incorporat- ing the simpler types. If a problem develops that the individual needs to solve, then the brain creates types of organizational structures through the process described above. It begins at the level of simple heaps, and increases in complexity to concepts. The individual uses each level of structural type to solve the problem: if one structure is not successful, then the potential of creating another type exists. For example, this occurs when the individual must resolve two contradictory types of mental processes, or classify a perceived object into a preexisting mental structure. Vygotskii stresses that goal oriented problem solving is a catalyst for the brain's inherent potential to create a hierarchy of structural types. Contemporary studies in cognition support this (Dougherty and Keller 1982). Research shows that individuals, in situations requiring task oriented problem solving, create models of organization different from preexisting linguistic organizations. Facing the goal of organizing tools for a specific job, individuals create organizational arrangements that are substantially different from their preexisting linguistic categories. These structures remain, as molecular reorganizations according to Vygotskii, and are useful for relevant future tasks. The structures Vygotskii describes as heaps are random mental associations that are grouped together by the individual, (without any justifiable underlying common basis) in a diffuse and undirected projection of the meaning of a specific sign to some perceived, inherently unrelated object or event. The nucleus of the heap forms around a random connection made between perceptions. However, the organization of the heap remains inherently unstable, due to its chance origin: the random association of things or events. This is the process of synchronisity: attaching meaning to seemingly meaningless, random objects or events and then using this to organize one's thoughts or beliefs. It is like dumping tinker toys on the floor, then using the color of a random piece as the basis for connecting everything of the same color into a single structure. This assumes that there is a rule that the color you picked could be changed at any time to the shape, or any other quality, of the last piece you added. If so, then all pieces organized by the original color, but not of the right shape, etc., would have to be removed. As Vygotskii says, heaps are inherently unstable. Vygotskii claims that there are three stages for the use of heaps in problem solving. Initially there is an accumulation of large numbers of heaps, through trial and error applications to a problem. When a heap fails to solve the problem, another heap replaces it. In the second stage, heaps syncretically or- ganize according to time and space perceptions. In the third stage, the a priori heaps undergo reorganization based on new information, or new connections that are organizational nuclei for new heaps. Vygotskii's position is an excellent description of trial and error. He argues that the major difference between heaps and complexes is that, in a complex, what associates are both inner subjective impressions and existing characteristics of a perception. According to this theory, complexes are primarily concrete groupings; and, only a factually present connection can lead to their formation. The whole complex forms around a nucleus of a single attribute, and they connect to one another. Therefore, they can be diverse or multiple. Vygotskii calls his five types of complexes associative, collection, chain, diffuse and pseudo concept. The associative type grounds in any actual, noticed characteristic of an object, or any non-randomly produced characteristic of a mental construct in the individual's mind. This is organization by association through one similar characteristic only (e.g., all bad smelling things). The collection type grounds in the individual's concrete impressions of some single trait by which things differ and compliment each other. This is association by contrast (e.g., the degree of softness, or soft versus hard things). Vygotskii argues that the collection type often combines with the associative type to form multiple complex organizations (e.g., bad smelling soft things versus bad smelling hard things). The chain complex, in contrast, is a dynamic consecutive joining of links into a single chain. No nucleus of organization exists, only related associations (i.e., bad smelling soft things - bad smelling soft wet things - big bad smelling soft wet things - small bad smelling soft wet things - small bad smelling hard things - small hard things - big hard things - hard things - et al.). Meaning transfer takes place from link to link (negative in the example given above), and remains somehow constant even though it can gradually evolve. Perceptions enter the groupings without intellectually abstracted attributes, and no single trait is a consistent nucleus upon which all the associated concrete attributes are associated. The diffuse complex is indefinitely changing in terms of size. Its connecting bonds are variable criteria that emerge from the association of some perceptual attribute with the memory of an attribute of a previous perception (e.g., big bad smelling wet things - mommy - girl friend - women - bad). Vygotskii's pseudo concept is simply one of the previous types of complexes. It is successful in a problem solving task, a task that could also be solved by use of a true concept. For all practical pur- poses, the pseudo complex is useful in the same way as a true concept. It, characteristically, is an organization of concrete, rather than abstract, perceptions and characteristics (e.g., one red block and one red block are two red blocks). A complex, even a pseudo complex, can either unify scattered impressions (by organizing discrete elements of experience into groupings) or abstract and single out elements or attributes of objects as a basis for grouping. In other words, a complex can either unite or separate; it cannot accomplish both. The true concept has the distinguishing characteristic that it combines both synthesis and analysis. It groups maximally similar perceptions (i.e., best matches) of dissimilar things by a single attribute that no longer has any concrete basis (e.g., one red block and one red block equal two red blocks, one chair and one chair equal two chairs, therefore one + one = two). "A concept emerges only when the abstracted traits are synthesized anew, and the resulting synthesis becomes the main instrument of thought" (Vygotskii 1962:78). Vygotskii believes that Piaget's ideas about syncretism, juxtaposition, insensitivity to contradiction, etc., simply stem from Piaget's lack of a coherent theoretical system. For example, to be upset by contradictory statements, a person has to view the contradictory statements in terms of some organizing system that includes both. ADULT VERSUS CHILD THOUGHT In a comparison of the two theories, one thing is clear; both Piaget and Vygotskii believe that there are definite qualitative differences between the mental structures of children and adults. Those qualitative differences are what cause the ob- served differences between children and adults, in their percep- tions and behavior. However, while the belief in qualitatively different mental structures for children and adults is common, it is not a conclusive scientific fact. There is a real question; are the mental differences between the child and the adult differences in kind, or merely differences in degree: qualitative versus quantitative? The distinction between performance and competence sheds light on that problem (Brown 1970). It is obvious that there are physical and maturational changes taking place from concep- tion to death; both Piaget and Vygotskii accept that as given. A child simply cannot perform activities (e.g., walking, speech, etc.) until the basic physical capacities to perform those ac- tivities come into existence. For example, language development in children is a matter of physical changes in the brain and body that create the potential for speech, and learning development. It creates increasingly more complex patterns and cross associations that eventually constitute the skills, knowledge, memory and thoughts for verbal capability. However, for both child and adult, potential and competence come before actual performance. Once the minimum physical potential for any ability generates there is always an understanding of and effort to manifest actual performance before accomplishing the goal. For example, few adults would elect to attempt complex statistical analyses without a prior period of study and learning: either formal or autodidactic. In the same way, children hear and respond to language, often long before they ever utter their first word. An adult, learning a second language, often understands it long before they can speak fluently enough to be understood. In both cases, the first attempt is rarely correct, and first performance is rarely at an adept level. Vygotskii's alternative position implies another major problem with Piaget's theory of progressive stages. Namely, Piaget states that only in the Formal/Operational stage (thirteen years of age to death) are human beings able to achieve the capacity for formal, abstract thought. Only then, and not always, can they theorize and hypothesize. The difficulty is that only a specific type of performance is being addressed by this assertion. Those familiar with the young will recognize that, before age seven, children exhibit trial and error behavior. These behaviors appear to reflect formal, abstract cognitive structures. Vygotskii recognizes this, and describes such phenomena in terms of pseudo concepts. People appear to form hypotheses and solve problems in their day to day life, at any age. In his description of heaps and complexes, Vygotskii assumes that generalizations are a form of abstraction. Realistically, what are trial and error? The process is the development of ideas that things ought to work (a goal), an existing picture of reality (a theory), a test (trial hypothesis), and evaluation (consciousness) of the results (or revision of the hypothesis and a new trial) for goal oriented success? Neither theory answers the central question. Is it a qualitative difference, or a difference in degree only, that causes developed adults to imagine such trials and errors men- tally while children often act out the behavior? It seems reasonable that the difference is one of memory and experience, not cognitive structural development. The most developed adults also act out trial and error behavior when a situation is highly unfamiliar and disorienting (and we occasionally talk to ourselves). The child who cries, throws tantrums, plays pleasantly, manipulates mother versus father, lies, or engages in any other activity to get what he, or she, wants is using some rather high level processes of abstraction. That child has a mental conception of a possible future in which the child's wants and needs are satisfied, that is if there is success in solving the problem of manipulating the outside world to his or her own ends. To explain this, and to understand it, the most parsimonious position would be that the underlying mental processes of children and adults are the same. Mental structures remain if they prove useful. If this is the case, then there would be no difference in kind between the structures and abstraction processes of the newborn child and the scientist of sixty years. Apparent differences would simply be due to the degree of physiological capacity, previous ex- perience, and memory. I propose that so-called differences in the mental processes of children and adults are only quantita- tive, not qualitative, in terms of types of mental processes and/or structures. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS Both Piaget's Genetic Epistemology and Vygotskii's dialectical materialist theory have questionable validity. The underlying assumptions of the theories bias around their respective ideological criteria. Any alternatives should begin without ideological, and goal oriented, assumptions in the interests of maximum objectivity. Ethnomethodology shows that, by definition, it is impossible to achieve total objectivity because of the nature of the perception of reality, and its deep particular roots at the level of culture. Still, it is both possible and practical to begin examining contemporary theories from such fields such as neuroscience or theoretical physics, to seek verifiable assumptions about the nature of reality. Make analogies with care; but, structuralism, as a methodol- ogy, lends itself to theorization across fields. Concepts about orders of inferred structure can transfer. Homological analysis, the search for similar relationships between cor- responding parts in different things, provides a rigorous and acceptable scientific principle by which this transfer can occur. For example, concepts of part-whole relationships are an integral part of structural methods in Physics as well as the cognitive or social sciences. There is a set of six part-whole relationships, based on equality and difference, which theoretically exist. In this set, there simply are no other possibilities. A whole can equal the sum of its aggregate parts, while each part is different from the whole. A whole can equal the sum of its aggregate parts, while parts and whole are the same. A whole can be less than the sum of its parts, while each part is different from the whole. A whole can be less than the sum of its parts, while parts and whole are the same. A whole can be greater than the sum of its parts, while each part is different from the whole. Finally, a whole can be greater than the sum of its parts, while parts and whole are the same. The first two options reflect the basic assumption of reduc- tionism, and have been explored in depth with only limited suc- cess. The third and fourth possibilities seem improbable. Subtle variations of the fifth possibility represent the assumptions made by both Piaget and Vygotskii, as well as the Gestalt and emergence concepts of mind, society, and culture. The last part-whole relationship, that the total system is greater than the sum of its parts, yet - somehow - the same as its parts, is the basis of holographic photography. It is a brain organizing principle documented by Karl Pribram (Gardner 1985:282-284). Pribram's concept is of constrained holographic distribution, which he terms holonomic. There is empirical evidence that this is a valid way to describe the organization and function of the brain. Therefore, it should not be an issue as an acceptable basic assumption for the development of an alternate theory of cognitive development. This perspective solves the problem of individual differen- tiation. In a hologram, it is the original interference of two distinct beams of light that encodes information about the image on the photographic plate. Later light focused on any part of that plate will cause the whole image to be seen. The focus and clarity of the image deteriorate as the part is reduced in size. Also, the relative perspective of the viewer determines which three dimensional portion of the image is seen. The analogy is, of course, that the original interference pattern of two types of stimulation of a whole determines the clarity and focus of resulting responses in separate parts. The relative perspective of the viewer determines the interpretation of the response. It means that the observer literally changes the observed, simply in the act of observation. Recall that Piaget never accepts this principle. In addition to the holonomic analogy, theoretical physics provides a model of reality that can explain the origin of cognitive structures: post quantum physics. As Piaget stresses, structures are not static physical entities; they are dynamic, and consist of constantly transforming relationships. Post quantum physics provides a model of causality, without strict determination. This is very similar to Popper's concept of propensity (1966; 1982), and it emerges from the idea of enfolded implicate orders in the organization of relationships. These structures transform under specific conditions, and unfolded into observable phenomenon (Bohm 1987) in what is the implicate order. This is like the transformation of light striking the eye: changing into memories of perceptions of form and color that could later manifest as a static human memory or dynamic dream state. Mathematics verifies the existence of regular structure within randomness, and consistent types of relationships in the organization of those patterns. Chaos theory (Gleick 1987) demonstrates non-linear regularities in random phenomena. This suggests the existence of underlying fields of organization (corresponding to hidden implicate orders) around which form and structure congeals, conserving complexity, and hidden regularity. Drawing from this, I suggest that an alternative approach to cognitive development must focus on distinguishing the different underlying fields of organization, around which dynamic mental structures are formed. Since the physical correspondence is the paradox of the dual and complementary nature of light (wave and particle), one avenue of investigation is to develop cognitive and sociological analogies for this. It would also be necessary to examine the sociological implications of the mechanisms of transformation and their relationship to randomness, cognitive structures, and associated behaviors. There is evidence from neuropsychology that holonomic processes (the constrained holographic analogy) are not the only processes in operation in the brain (Gazzaniga 1985). There are also independent modules of the brain that communicate and interact with each other to create the mind (Gardner 1985) as Vygotskii, Piaget, and traditional cognitive science assume and demonstrate. Any new paradigm, thus, must take into account the existence and operation of multiple orders of mental structures, each with certain distinct laws of operation. It must also con- sider laws governing the processes of transformations between them, much as Goffman (1974) suggested. This is the most criti- cal need: the identification and demonstration of primary pat- terns (fields) of organization behind mental structures, and the principles of their transformation (O'Brien 1988). CONCLUSION Empirical evidence contradicts some of the basic assertions made by Piaget, and by Vygotskii; therefore, their validity is questionable. Piaget's biases, regarding the children and society of Martinique, raise questions about his objectivity. They show that Piaget steps beyond the limits of presenting scientific models open to change; and, instead, accepts his own beliefs as paramount reality: ethnomethodologically, only one reality among many possible. His use of a rejected model of unilinear evolution further weakens his theory. His basic goals and assumptions make his personal values and research conclusions suspect (i.e., to achieve God's good - to hasten evolution and development - justifies bypassing the good of the individual, or the group. When the stated goals of a social scientific theory include intentional teleology, then we have to accept that there is a genuine possibility that any conclusions deriving from that theory are, at best, biased. At worst, they may be intentionally false. Both Genetic Epistemology and Dialectical Materialism are open to such a charge. Vygotskii's ideology, Marxist-Leninist, implicitly orients to a single end of evolutionary development (something that Vygotskii accepts, even though he uses multi-linear models of cognitive development). Marxist ideology professes one in- evitable end, if the environment in which they exist meets specific conditions: a set of fixed laws of history and development, and a goal of hastening the final state. Eth- nomethodologically speaking, Vygotskii's theory is the reflection of Marxist world-view, and Piaget's theory is a reflection of the theistic West. Both theories are deficient, and both reach contradictory conclusions. An alternative is called for, one that avoids the initially flawed analogies and the underlying teleological pur- poses. However, a comparison of the use of unit versus element approaches in cognitive development - by Piaget and Vygotskii - alludes to an important set of concepts for examining collective phenomena. Depending upon the use of these, dramatically different conclusions are possible. A model with the capacity to define, and clarify, such part-whole relationships - and that is physiologically based, but without the assumptions of reductionism, teleology, or tautology - would be invaluable. I suggest that an holonomic model meets these criteria. Since culture is as much a system of mind as it is material artifacts; and, since it is instrumental in individual develop- ment as the repository of world-view, I propose a new definition that is consistent with the known neuropsychological processes based on distributed (i.e., parallel, unitary, or holographic) organization. It is also consistent with the more traditional elemental and linear models of mind (i.e., Gestalt concepts and systemic emergence due to the interaction of separate mental components). Culture is a constructed, but structurally preexisting, holonomic system with particular content; it is more than - but mutually contained within - the sum of its components: units and elements. It emerges from the interactions of individuals and their environment (context), and transforms in the interaction of perspective (situation definitions) and that context. It is structurally parallel among all the members of a culture, but is unequally accessible due to differential contexts, situations, and specific content. It is equally shared and unequally manifested by its units; it is unequally shared and unequally manifested by its elements; and, its units and elements interact with, and alter in response to each other. It is transformed, spatially and temporally, within and between agents; and, it is transmitted in a non- duplicated (transformed) manner within and between generations. Culture does not causally determine the path, or final form, of growth and behavior; rather, it acts as the constitutive design for what is probable in subsequent development. As such, society equates to the sum of all given elements (i.e., interacting agents and manifest artifacts, but not cultural units) that participate in a common culture, and who have overtly - or covertly - accept membership in it. This remains only a tentative theoretical suggestion: albeit, with strong supporting evidence from neurophysiological studies of mind-brain as a self organizing system. Such an alternative theoretically does allow for a synthesis of Piaget's and Vygotskii's works, while relating them directly to contemporary knowledge in different fields social scientific inquiry (i.e., cultural anthropology, social psychology, traditional sociology, et al.). It provides a different vehicle through which to explain the conflicting experimental findings that plague either older theory. Also, new possibilities exist for understanding the dynamics of structured, emergent, interactive, or conflicting systems at both the micro and macro levels - especially in the practical applications of socialization and resocialization, the role of cognition and emotion in social processes, and deviance and rehabilitation. REFERENCES * * Formated for the Journal of Symbolic Interaction. 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