======================================================================== 689 Date: Mon, 6 Jun 94 18:10:42 EST From: JOBRIEN@ucs.indiana.edu X-To: PO%"antowner%ubvm.bitnet@uicvm.uic.edu" Subject: Submission for WJA: World Journal of Anthropology, #3 from John O'Brien To: antowner%ubvm.bitnet@uicvm.uic.edu CULTURE AND AGENCY: A `UNIT' APPROACH revised* @ Copyright 1990. Do not quote without author's permission. * Revision of a paper presented to the roundtable on culture, American Sociological Association general meetings in August 1989, and accepted for presentation at the 1990 International Sociological Association meetings: working committee on theory, Madrid, Spain (July). JOHN D. O'BRIEN 1.1.90 ABSTRACT This paper presents a conceptual unit model of culture. By doing so, the macro-micro linkage, subject-object determinancy- indeterminancy and generalization problems are addressed in- directly (REFER TO PAGE ). It is proposed that there are six general organizational strategies identifiable as broadly defined categories of the internal structural components of culture (REFER TO PAGE ). Hypothetically, these types can be used as a set of standard criteria for both macro and micro level comparisons. It is suggested that one linkage between levels, social structures and individual acts is in the existence of multiple orders of mutually embedded, and mutually interactive, tendencies for organizational patterning. It is concluded that a unit concept of culture is viable if it is based on distributed-parallel heterarchical organization, and if it is conceptualized via an holonomic analogy (REFER TO PAGE ). It is also concluded that the unit model provides a valid method of generalization and can be used to predict broad organizational tendencies in emergent systems (von Bertallanfy 1968) and individual behaviors. PROBLEM In Culture and Agency, 1988, Archer suggested discarding the heuristic of an holistic culture and replacing it with a limited interactive socio-cultural system concept. "Current theoretical deficiencies in the sociological analyses of culture are directly attributable to the confusion of cultural and socio- cultural systems" (Archer 1988, p. 7). She notes that culture and agency are ordinarily perceived as excessively epiphenomenal (Popper and Eccles 1977, pp. 72-99) or conflated, and that the internal integration and causal manifestations of culture are actually two separate and directly unrelated systems. This approach raises justifiable claims that a genuine unit description of culture does not exist (Archer 1988, p. 1) and, thus, cannot be used in cultural analysis without resorting to virtually metaphysical assertions. The problem with this criticism is that it is absolutely correct. Culture has been used as a concept for nearly a century, but there is no universal definition and the quintessential questions have never been resolved. The locus of prime cause still has not been determined: ideational or material. There is continuing debate over part-whole relationships: culture as an epiphenomenon equal to the sum of its components, versus a causal entity greater than the sum of its parts. Each of these questions involves the search for general laws (D'Andrade 1986, pp. 19-41), but raise an even more fundamental problem. Is it even relevant to attempt to discern general laws due to the unique nature of the disciplines involved and what they study? As an illustration, an eclectic can draw on the frequent bias for separating socio-economic structure from cul- ture, which usually assumes that prime cause is located in infra-structure, rather than social-structure or super-structure (Harris 1980). If that is insufficient, there are the emphases on symbols and the unification of opposites, on the effect of language on perceptions and behaviors, or on ecological relationships between environmental and human systems. One could also draw upon contrasts made between ideas of universal cognitive orientations influenced directly by social role demands, versus models of the constitution of society and culture out of negotiated interactions. Arguments for each are thorough, but none unequivocally answer certain questions. How are we able to deal with structure, function, socio-cultural evolution, prediction and causal primacy, social and cultural change, culture and personality, symbolism and cognition, or other concepts when we have objective versus subjective contradictions between the models? To what degree can can we validly generalize? The problem is compounded by the need to interpret culturally specific realities and meanings, but without a common method to standard- ize findings from the different paradigms. This flaw emanates from contradictory assumptions about the objective or subjective nature of reality. Because of these negations, what we think of as culture may well have to be perceived somewhat as it has been by Anthony Giddens (1979; 1981): a real phenomena centered in being or presence, described as if it were a gigantic bubble, expanding, contracting and changing in dimensions of relative space-time, with causality operating interactively and multi- directionally across and between all of the relative dimensions. The question then becomes ontological; how can this be? At present, neither Giddens' structuration, general systems, cul- tural materialism, neo-functionalism nor interactionist- constitutional approaches are complete explanations. One untried conceptual procedure is to explore the objective- subjective paradox through postulating an order of organization linked to, but not determined by, the biological or environmental (Pribram 1966; 1968; 1971; 1982; 1986; n.d.; Pribram, Nuwer and Baron 1974). The fundamental thesis of this approach is that there is some essential sameness between all systemic levels, including the biological, and that prime cause can be found at the order of that sameness. This is different than the ethnomethodological disposition of mental rules, in that its unitary identity could only be a domain of structures and transformative processes common to mental, biological and environmental systems. The proposed order, and the patterns which we usually associate with mental-biological-environmental realms, would be mutually enfolded (REFER TO PAGES and ). Using this line of reasoning, a resolution of the cultural objective-subjective paradox can be offered through the interaction and flow between different real orders: an immaterial, existing but usually unobservable global order and an observable local order (Bohm and Peat 1987; Bradley 1987; Grof 1983; Ravn 1988), both of which may have subjective or objective manifestations. Such a multiplicity of organization points to a reality that must normally be constrained, but holographically distributed within those constraints (O'Brien 1988; Pribram 1986), at subjective and objective levels. Therefore it could be fluid in the relative dimensions of space- time as Giddens asserts (Bohm and Peat 1987), as well as interactive as Alexander posits. In this procedure, the global class of organizational strategies cannot be confused with local ideational or material levels. An implicate global order may have both idealist and materialist potentials. EMBEDDEDNESS AND HOLOGRAPHIC ORGANIZATION * * A projected image is embedded, encoded holographi- cally, within a single beam of light. When that image is projected from a light source, through a single lens, only one reproduction of the original image is seen. But, since the minimum code for the image is embedded equally throughout the light, if the beam is split by the introduction of a new set of lenses (represented above by glasses) multiple images result, each one a complete reproduction of the original. However, if the lenses differ (ie. filtered or shaped differently) dissimilar perspectives of the original will result). CULTURAL EMBEDDEDNESS * * Holographically embedded patterns permeate man's in- teraction with his environment, and influence the goal oriented tasks of culture bearers. Each culture, and each culture bearer, has particular content organized to the embedded pattern. Any particular culture or culture bearer thus acts as a lense, and the final form of the goal-solution emerges, predilected by what the lense al- lows to be transmitted to the task at hand, but each specific solution is only a different perspective of the same embedded pattern. A manifested local order may also be reflected subjectively or objectively. For example, we think of values as, perhaps, an ideal such as private ownership or the freedom to engage in profit-making activities for personal gain, but value is a con- cept best defined scientifically as an assigned quantity. Means-ends ownership of private property for the generation of economic profits may be assigned positive value in certain societies, or negative value as it did in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics until 1990. It is not private ownership and freedom to profit (the local norms) per se which are the values; rather the value is the quantity of force (the global order) attached to a socially defined variable. This is a manifest fallacy: mistaking particular examples of a category with the category itself. This type of concrete-abstract conflation is one cause of the theoretical deficiencies in the analysis of culture: a mark of confusing the cultural system with the socio-cultural system (Archer 1988, p. 7). Concepts useful in avoiding this problem are the images of heterarchical and hierarchical levels of con- strained holographic organization: holonomic. These ideas admit a unit definition of culture which can be used to standardize and compare the subjective and objective. Hypothetically, it should thus be possible to identify, generalize and predict the probability of specific social acts and/or aggregate behaviors, evolutionary shifts, cultural transformations, and/or socio-cultural discontinuities in general, if not in their particulars. UNIT DEFINITION Culture is a constituted but structurally pre-existing holonomic system, with particular content, greater than but mutually contained within the sum of its component units and elements. It emerges from the interactions of individuals and their environment, and is transformed by perspective and context. It is essentially shared by all members of the culture, but is unequally accessible due to context and situation (REFER TO PAGE ). It is transmitted in a non- duplicated (transformed) manner within and between generations. It does not determine behavior; rather it acts as the primary guide for what is probable. It interacts with, and alters in response to, its component parts. Society is, then, the sum of all given elements (interacting agents and manifest artifacts) that share and jointly create a common culture, who have overtly or covertly accepted membership in it. Cultural systems should be conceptualized as interactive (Archer 1988), but with aspects of mutual causation shifting within relative dimensions of space-time as Giddens suggests. This permits a theoretical interpretation of linear causal analyses without limiting the system to unidirectional or non- constitutive processes. Additionally, it deals with the determinancy-indeterminancy problem by providing sufficient scope for the individual. The unit concept, proposed here, permits the proposition of mutual constitution, produced at the order of structural tendency, and the logical possibility of mutual causation. Yet, it does not lose the realistic proposals of pre-existence, enhancement and constraint. This is so because the homologous structures discovered between micro and macro phenomena would be due to the enfoldment of the organized unit in both. Thus, the cultural system (a whole greater than the sum of its parts) is a unitary concept that differs from the Gestalt concept in that, essentially, parts and whole are basically equal and mutually self-containing. While, the socio-cultural system, society, (a whole equal to the sum of its parts) is elemental. The distinction between element and unit is critical here. A unit is the smallest possible bounded entity which contains all of the essential characteristics of the whole: a holon. An element is the smallest possible bounded entity which is a whole unto itself (O'Brien n.d.). Since cultural knowledge is contained, in part, within the human mind (exceptions being archival and reified culture), culture and personality can be seen as different human mental systems. One is restricted to the individual and one is not. Homological patterns, reflecting a unit, should be found in both systems. This should be true for each individual mental systems, as well as for collective systems. Therefore, it is justifiable to seek some understanding of the general structure of culture by examining the processes of structuring in the mind. A priori structures in mental organizations, concepts, are homologous to patterns of organizational strategies in other phenomena. Their commonality is what predilects micro be- haviors, manifested as social acts based on local structures (Bohm and Peat 1987; Ravn 1988) such as language grammars, symbolic systems or normative rule systems. A second, related but more specific level of structural patterning can be identified through Needham's concept of the Synthetic Image (1973; 1978; Galt 1982). It has the potential to describe non- linguistic, symbolic or emotional structures. Synthetic Images are simply constituted pattern organizations developed from combinations of limited numbers of Primary Factors relating directly to perceptions. When an archetypical structure is constructed within the individual mind, or in the cultural system through group/environment interactions, the percept and related affective values are activated to organize day-to-day events, and meaning is determined by the association of percepts according to pre-existing structures of strategies. Such ordered systems become the nuclei around which normative systems form. However, they do not remain constituted, or operative at all times, interaction is required in order to bring together the relevant Primary Factors constituting the basic building blocks of a pattern. If descriptive measures of these processes are developed for any given explicate system, cultural or individual, they may be used to generate quantified standard scores. The scores then can be used to determine the parameters of any system along ordinal level scales of relative organizational type. After identifica- tion and definition, the probability of the strategic form of an emergent could theoretically be predicted. Thus, it is possible to propose how objective or subjective macro systems directly ef- fect micro systems, and how the locus of cause shifts between them. ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES I am suggesting that there are, at least, six morphogenetic organizational strategies which can be used to define the basic structure of an holonomically organized unit of culture. These are termed DIRECT, APPROXIMATE, RELATIVE, INCORPORATIVE, SYN- THETIC and TRANSPOSITIONAL. There is no implication of any ranked hierarchy associated with these strategies; rather, all of the propensities exist in a heterarchically organized unit, simultaneously. Any appearance of dominance by one over another is a matter of the manifestation of the unit in a situation and the probability frequency of its utilization. This idea ap- proximates, but is not equal to, Popper's concepts (Miller 1985; Popper 1966; 1982) of propensity and World (3) three. Strategies of organization are both processes and patterns. They are morphogenetic prospects, and they should be conceptual- ized much as Weber conceived of ideal types. However, unlike Weber's types these have prior, present and future potential in a real frequency domain. They represent only parallel- distributed fields of tendency. As the images in Plato's cave, this is of a different nature than linear time; it is spectral and of the duree. As pure tendency, strategies are totally immaterial even in particular displays of locally explicit social phenomena. Any exhibition of these strategies, such as a social organization, is only a contextually influenced perspective: a temporary interaction of fields partially dependent upon definitions of time-space frames. Due to this interaction and interference, hypothetically, the process and pattern could be analyzed through techniques appropriate to slow wave form phenomena. Additionally, at the level of micro and macro phenomena, strategies may display complementarity, and what determines the aspect that is perceived is simply the contextual situation, as defined. Perceptually, this is much the same as an hologram ap- pearing to change as one looks at it from a different angle. Therefore, when we identify basic cultural structures such as Synthetic Images, we are examining a particular manifestation, or local order, of the probable organizational strategies. And, when we examine day-to-day behaviors or social interactions, we are also looking at variations of the common global order. DIRECT strategies function to duplicate existing patterns of organization in order to maintain overall system stability. This is reflected in mental systems when a perception is distinguished from the environment, but without any separation in the environment/perceiver relationship as a whole. It is a lineal process in which stimuli elicit direct responses that then repli- cate the structure of the global order. Conceptually, the opera- tion of instinct or neurological pre-wiring in non-human biologi- cal organization accomplishes a direct strategy. The same con- cept is demonstrated by some data processing systems, such as the use of a shell program to maintain overall processing organiza- tion for a multiplicity of other programs. Other examples would include Pavlovian stimulus-response activities, fight-flight im- pulses (Hall 1969, p. 12), and mini-max hypothesis rational choice behavior. This is of particular interest, since mini-max cost-benefit calculations are in no way instinctual; they are a reflexive process. However, there is an enfolded, common denominator in all of the examples noted here. During cost-benefit game calculation, a perceived organization of probable realities, based on estimates of linear cause and effect, is generated by the player. Choice, and often behavior, is then initiated in order to duplicate that perceived organization and to maintain the stability of the system as per- ceived and desired. This is a higher level mental function, but at the order of prototypical structure a functional attempt is made for an exact duplication of self-conceptualized organiza- tion. This same type of duplicative effort is accomplished by instinctual systems, or conditioned systems. The major dif- ference is in the locus of control. In the instinctual this is genetically coded pre-formation; in the conditioned it is in an imposed outside source; and in mini-max game calculation it is, at least, partially self-determined by the player. There is no question that the alternative loci of control indicate qualita- tively different levels of operation, but the function of duplicating an embedded structure does not change. The only dif- ference is that in two cases, the embedded structure is originated by causes exterior to the entity, and in the mini-max case it is developed by a self-organizing system. APPROXIMATE organizing strategies do not precisely duplicate; rather they function to maintain the viability of an existing system by estimating it through a process of translation. This includes the distinction of perceptions from the environment and the separation of perceptions from the perceiver in mental systems. The strategy resolves distinctions and separations by associating perceived form and structure to any existing or- ganization which most closely resembles the perception. This is analogous to the way the term literal is used: representing translation from one form to another without loss of the essen- tial character of either. One excellent example is found in categorizing phonetic differences into phonemes, while maintain- ing comprehension. The strategy is not limited to linguistic phenomena, and another example can be found in micro interactions on a day-to-day basis. Individuals account in order to trans- late the behavior of others into their own internal representa- tion of social reality. In ecological systems, the strategy is observed in parallel evolution: ie. bats and birds. The former is a mammal, airborne and frequently an insectivore; the latter are reptilian in origin, airborne and frequently insectivores. The commonality in each case is the process of maintaining a vi- able system by replicating, not duplicating, the form of the homologous relationships. RELATIVE strategies maintain system stability through small changes in the system itself. The process resolves contrasts be- tween the form and structure of particular manifestations and any pre-existing order. It joins the particular to existing or- ganizations with any similarity at all. This would include dif- ferentiations between perceptions and the perceiver, as well as perceptions and the environment in mental systems. It resembles gradual evolutionary processes, and takes place by modification of the pre-existing form through incorporation into it of struc- tures whose parameters are different from the organization they are incorporated into. One example is successful mutation, and another is cultural evolution such as takes place through tech- nological innovation. Both cases allow for the emergence of new forms of local order that are related to, but qualitatively dif- ferent from, the old. Simile is an analogous concept: likeness, resemblance, similarity. What is common to all particular ex- amples of relative strategies is that an a priori structure is altered into a similar, but new, form by the addition of some un- equivocally novel elements (REFER TO PAGE ), which did not exist in the pre-existing pattern. However, none of the original structure is lost in the process. INCORPORATIVE organizational strategies operate in a way that equates to system growth, or reduction, by associating percepts to, or disassociating percepts from, an existing system of hierarchical organization. Mental systems mirror this strategy in differentiating between percepts, the perceiver, perceptions and the environment. This is a process of resolving relatively large degrees of contrast by joining specific organizational forms to unlike patterns in pre-existing organizations. It results in a final organizational structure which is quantita- tively different from its original form. The process embodies different units and elements within a single category (REFER TO PAGE ). The analogy here is to the concept of metonym: trans- ference and substitution. Examples include biological systems growth, cultural, socio-political and economic expansion and con- traction or the expansion of the Roman pantheon of dieties as new nations and cultural elements of the empire were incorporated into its structure. What is common to all instances of this strategy is the linking of hierarchical systems by replacing one portion of an elemental system with a unit of the pre-existing organization. SYNTHETIC strategies deal with conflict and contradiction. They are virtually dialectical processes, but can be divided into two sub-processes. Both are manifested mentally by the distinc- tion of perception and environment as well as the separation of perception and the perceiver. Both bring about stability by al- tering the total a priori system only as far as necessary to preserve it from destruction (or by removing contradictions from the system until such time as they can be, or must be, dealt with). These two sub-processes induce resolution of paradoxes by complementarity (REFER TO PAGE ) in conflicting and non- conflicting contexts. Conceptually, this is analogous to the idea of metaphor: figuratively, to change into. Resolution of paradoxes in conflicting states is the first sub-process. It takes place takes place through the joining of mutually exclusive opposites, through a dialectic which generates a synthetically new form of local organization. Paradoxes are associated to the new structural pattern; while, failure to make any resolution results in long term disassociation and fragmentation of one or both of the mutually exclusive sets. The second sub-process effects the resolution of non- conflicting contradictions. It takes place through the process of separation, suppression and disordered accumulation. No ac- tual synthetic generation transpires, and anomalies accumulate until such time as they can be resolved by some other process, or processes. When the volume of unresolved contradictions becomes so large that total local system can no longer operate effec- tively with existing organizations, it simply disintegrates. In this case, either all contradictions are resolved by a forced shift into another process of association, or the existing struc- tures fragment and the total organization becomes inoperative. Archer (1988) describes this most effectively, and this sub- process is analogous to what is termed accumulation by Kuhn (1970, pp. 52-91). The former sub-process is partially creative in that it can generate new hierarchies of form and structure as a local order. However, when resolving dialectical syntheses fail to take place, the result is slow system decay or rapid system fragmentation. Examples of the strategy include Marx' and Hegel's dialectics, and the generation of an oxymoronic linguistic category. Here, resolution is accomplished by generating a new concept, with meaning, in which both mutually exclusive sets can be seen as common. Other examples of this process are found in Habermas' utilization of Festinger's model of cognitive dissonance and Levi-Strauss' use of binary oppositions. Biological correspon- dences include the bilateral symmetry of the human brain and its operation as a functional whole (Ornstein 1973). At the macro level, correspondences are found in initial cross-cultural con- tacts, ecological versus technological demands and so on. The common factor in all cases is the existence of mutually exclusive characteristics which cannot functionally co-exist within any a priori local structural system. There is no mutual embedding of structure; the unresolved paradoxes are competing elemental forms (REFER TO PAGE ). Sub-process one constitutes a new ele- ment which is hierarchically common to all contradictory sets, but is not enfolded within them; metaphorically, this is Gestalt. Sub-process two simply separates the paradoxes, and suppresses one or more of the elements. TRANSPOSITIONAL strategy is a transcending and transforming process of resolution by disassociation from local structures, reorganization into heterarchical form at the global level and reassociation into new local structures which may, or may not, be hierarchical. Mental systems exhibit this in the distinction of perception and environment, a distinction between percept and the perceiver (but not a separation), a distinction between the environment and the perceiver, and a unique distinction between pattern organizations and the perceiver. The analogy to this process is the synechdoche: whole for part, part for whole. This is a constitutional, transformational holographic process through which local constraints are eradicated and part-whole relation- ships become mutually other-containing on the basis of a common global unit (REFER TO PAGE ). Unique structures and organiza- tions are self-generated, or accepted from sources external to the entity in question to initiate new constraints, and the relationships between component parts are reorganized into a new emergent whole. This strategy is evidenced in the formation of charismatic cults (Bradley 1987) and their resulting social structures. It has been documented in the work of Vygotskii (O'Brien n.d., p. 13), and it is similar to what Kuhn (1970) calls the emergence of a new paradigm under crisis. Mehan and Wood (1975) describe the strategy as permeability, made evident when the unquestioned axioms of reality are perceived as in- adequate. This appears to be the primary mechanism of system emergence. Correspondences include the establishment of revitalization movements, faith and/or shamanistic healing, in- vention, the reorganization of societies around agriculturally suitable plant life, the movement between implicate to explicate order in Quantum mechanics (Grof 1983), and the change from a distributed global order to a local order and back to an altered distributed order (Ravn 1988). The generic regularity in all examples is that a priori structures are eliminated, and previ- ously nonexistent structures replace them through the mutual en- foldment of existing content and a new common unit of form. CONCLUSIONS In conclusion, the argument that an holistic representation of culture is not viable, because of the separation of internal integrating mechanisms and causal relationships and because a unit concept cannot be developed for it (Archer 1988), is not ab- solutely correct. A unit concept can be developed by utilizing analogies of holonomic organization, and proposing mutually en- folded global and local orders. Potentially, this allows for generalization, and there is no inherent reason why such a unit cannot be applied to the analysis of culture and agency. Secon- dary levels of structural organization can be discerned through Needham's proposition of Synthetic Image, the discrimination of ethno-rules and the identification of grammatical or biological systems et al. A unit model, based on organizational strategies, hypothetically resolves the subject-object problem as well as many idealist-materialist arguments (REFER TO PAGE ) and suggests a mechanism of real tendency by which the determinancy- indeterminancy problem can be addressed. In the same manner, it suggests that there is an effective alternate for conceptualizing some linkages between macro and micro phenomena. 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